

Top of the Week

Newsweek

Cover Story

The United States of America is now so powerful that it is scaring the rest of the world. On the brink of war with Iraq, the Bush team sees itself defending freedom; much of the globe, however, sees swagger and arrogance. Fareed Zakaria explains why—and suggests how to both project force and have friends. **Page 14**



JUDA NEWBYA—REUTERS—CORBIS

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JACK'S BACK FOR MORE:
Fun facts for Oscar lovers

COVER: Illustration by Christopher Short for NEWSWEEK based on MOAB test weapon.

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VIRTUALLY ALONE

U.S. Marines conduct urban-combat exercises in Kuwait, not far from the Iraqi border



THE PRROGANT EMPIRE

America's unprecedented power scares the world, and the Bush administration has only made it worse. How we got here—and what we can do about it now.

PART ONE

BY FAREED ZAKARIA

THE UNITED STATES WILL SOON BE at war with Iraq. It would seem, on the face of it, a justifiable use of military force. Saddam Hussein runs one of the most tyrannical regimes in modern history. For more than 25 years he has sought to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and has, in several documented cases, succeeded. He gassed 60,000 of his own people in 1986 in Halabja. He has launched two catastrophic wars, sacrificing nearly a million Iraqis and killing or wounding more than a million Iranians. He has flouted 16 United Nations resolutions over 12 years that have warned him to disarm or else, including one, four months ago, giving him a “final opportunity” to do so “fully and immediately” or face “serious consequences.” But in its campaign against Iraq,

America is virtually alone. Never will it have waged a war in such isolation. Never have so many of its allies been so firmly opposed to its policies. Never has it provoked so much public opposition, resentment and mistrust. And all this before the first shot has been fired.

Watching the tumult around the world, it's evident that what is happening goes well beyond this particular crisis. Many people, both abroad and in America, fear that we are at some kind of turning point, where well-established mainstays of the global order—the Western Alliance,

European unity, the United Nations—seem to be cracking under stress. These strains go well beyond the matter of Iraq, which is not vital enough to wreak such damage. In fact, the debate is not about Saddam anymore. It is about America and its role in the new world. To understand the present crisis, we must first grasp how the rest of the world now perceives American power.

It is true that the United States has some allies in its efforts to topple Saddam. It is also true that some of the governments opposing action in Iraq do so not for love of peace and international harmony but for more cynical reasons. France and Russia have a long history of trying to weaken the containment of Iraq to ensure that they can have good trading relations with it. France, after all, helped Saddam

Even a successful war will not make the world snap out of a deep and widening mistrust

Hussein build a nuclear reactor that was obviously a launching pad for a weapons program. (Why would the world's second largest oil producer need a nuclear power plant?) And France's Gaullist tendencies are, of course, simply its own version of unilateralism.

But how to explain that the vast majority of the world, with little to gain from it, is in the Franco-Russian camp? The administration claims that many countries support the United States but do so quietly. That signals an even deeper problem. Countries are furtive in their support for the administration not because they fear Saddam Hussein but because they fear their own people. To support America today in much of the world is politically dangerous. Over the past year the United States became a campaign issue in elections in Germany, South Korea and Pakistan. Being anti-American was a vote-getter in all three places.

Look at the few countries that do publicly support us. Tony Blair bravely has forged ahead even though the vast majority of the British people disagree with him and deride him as "America's poodle." The leaders of Spain and Italy face equally strong public opposition to their stands. Donald Rumsfeld has proclaimed, with his characteristic tactlessness, that while "old Europe"—France and Germany—might oppose U.S. policy, "new Europe" embraces them. This is not exactly right.


The governments of Central Europe support Washington, but the people oppose it in almost the same numbers as in old Europe. Between 70 and 80 percent of Hungarians, Czechs

RALLYING POINT

Demonstrators in Seoul last week joined the global outcry against a U.S.-led war in Iraq



CHUNG SUNG-JUN—GETTY IMAGES



and Poles are against an American war in Iraq, with or without U.N. sanction. (The Poles are more supportive in some surveys.) The administration has made much of the support of Vaclav Havel, the departing Czech president. But the incoming president, Vaclav Klaus—a pro-American, Thatcherite free-marketer—said last week that on Iraq his position is aligned with that of his people.

Some make the argument that Europeans are now pacifists, living in a “postmodern paradise,” shielded from threats and unable to imagine the need for military action. But then how to explain the sentiment in Turkey, a country that sits on the Iraqi border? A long-time ally, Turkey has fought with America in conflicts as distant as the Korean War, and supported every American military action since then. But opposition to the war now runs more than 90 percent there. Despite Washington’s offers of billions of dollars in new assistance, the government cannot get parliamentary support to allow American troops to move into Iraq from Turkish bases. Or consider Australia, another crucial ally, and another country where a majority now opposes American policy. Or Ireland. Or India. In fact, while the United States has the backing of a dozen or so governments, it has the support of a majority of the people in only one country in the world, Israel. If that is not isolation, then the word has no meaning.

It is also too easy to dismiss the current crisis as one more in a series of transatlantic family squabbles that stretch back over the decades. Some in Washington have pointed out that whenever the United States has taken strong military action—for example, the deployment of Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe in the early 1980s—there was popular opposition in Europe. True, but this time it’s different. The street demonstrations and public protests of the early 1980s made for good television images. But the reality was that in most polls, 30 to 40 percent of Europeans supported American policies. In Germany, where pacifist feelings ran sky high, 53 percent of Germans supported the Pershing deployments, according to a 1981 poll in *Der Spiegel*. In France, a majority supported American policy through much of Ronald Reagan’s two terms, even preferring him to the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale, in 1984.

Josef Joffe, one of Germany’s leading commentators, observes that during the cold war anti-Americanism was a left-wing phenomenon. “In contrast to it, there was always a center-right that was anti-communist and thus pro-American,” he explains. “The numbers waxed and waned, but you always had a solid base of support for the United States.” The cold war kept Europe pro-American. For example, 1968 was a time of mass protests against American policies in Vietnam, but it was also the year of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Europeans (and Asians) could oppose America, but their views were balanced by wariness of the Soviet



DISTANT MEETING

FDR made the arduous trip to Yalta in 1945 to talk peace with Churchill and Stalin

threat and communist behavior. Again, the polls bear this out. European opposition even to the Vietnam War never approached the level of the current opposition to Iraq. This was true outside Europe as well. In Australia, for example, a majority of the public supported that country’s participation in the Vietnam War through 1971, when it withdrew its forces.

But today no such common threat exists, and support for America is far more fluid. Center-right parties might still support Washington, but many do so almost out of inertia and without much popular support for their stand. During the recent German election, Gerhard Schröder campaigned openly against America’s Iraq policy. Less noted was that his conservative opponent, Edmund Stoiber, did so as well, at one point (briefly) outflanking Schröder by saying he would not even allow American bases in Germany to participate in the war.

In one respect, I believe that the Bush administration is right: this war will look better when it is over. The military campaign

The Age of Generosity

MOST AMERICANS HAVE NEVER felt more vulnerable. September 11 was not only the first attack on the American mainland in 150 years, but it was also sudden and unexpected. Three thousand civilians were brutally killed without any warning. In the months that followed, Americans worried about anthrax attacks, biological terror, dirty bombs and new suicide squads. Even now, the day-to-day rhythms of American life are frequently interrupted by terror alerts and warnings. The average American feels a threat to his physical security unknown since the early years of the republic.

Yet after 9-11, the rest of the world saw something quite different. They saw a country that was hit by terrorism, as some of them had been, but that was able to respond on a scale that was almost unimaginable. Suddenly terrorism was the world's chief priority, and every country had to reorient its foreign policy accordingly.

Roosevelt was sick. Traveling 40 hours by sea and air must have taken the life out of him.

Pakistan had actively supported the Taliban for years; within months it became that regime's sworn enemy. Washington announced that it would increase its defense budget by almost \$50 billion, a sum greater than the total annual defense budget of Britain or Germany. A few months later it toppled a regime 6,000 miles away—almost entirely from the air—in Afghanistan, a country where the British and Soviet empires were bogged down at the peak of their power. It is now clear that the current era can really have only one name, the unipolar world—an age with only one global power. America's position today is unprecedented. A hundred years ago, Britain was a superpower, ruling a quarter of the globe's population. But it was still only the second or third richest country in the world and one among many strong military powers. The crucial measure of military might in the early 20th century was naval power, and Britain ruled the waves with a fleet as large as the next two navies put together. By contrast, the United States will spend as much next year on defense as the rest of the world put together (yes, all 191 countries). And it will do so devoting 4 percent of its GDP, a low level by postwar standards.

American dominance is not simply military. The U.S. economy is as large as the next three—Japan, Germany and Britain—put together. With 5 percent of the world's population, this one country accounts for 43 percent of the world's economic production, 40 percent of its high-technology production and 50 percent of its research and development. If you look at the indica-

will probably be less difficult than many of Washington's opponents think. Most important, it will reveal the nature of Saddam's barbarous regime. Prisoners and political dissidents will tell stories of atrocities. Horrific documents will come to light. Weapons of mass destruction will be found. If done right, years from now people will remember above all that America helped rid Iraq of a totalitarian dictator.

But the administration is wrong if it believes that a successful war will make the world snap out of a deep and widening mistrust and resentment of American foreign policy. A war with Iraq, even if successful, might solve the Iraq problem. It doesn't solve the America problem. What worries people around the world above all else is living in a world shaped and dominated by one country—the United States. And they have come to be deeply suspicious and fearful of us.



Available Online: To read complete coverage from NEWSWEEK's international edition, edited by Fareed Zakaria, log on to the Web at Newsweek-Int.MSNBC.com

tors of future growth, all are favorable for America. It is more dynamic economically, more youthful demographically and more flexible culturally than any other part of the world. It is conceivable that America's lead, especially over an aging and sclerotic Europe, will actually increase over the next two decades.

Given this situation, perhaps what is most surprising is that the world has not ganged up on America already. Since the beginnings of the state system in the 16th century, international politics has seen one clear pattern—the formation of balances of power against the strong. Countries with immense military and economic might arouse fear and suspicion, and soon others coalesce against them. It happened to the Hapsburg Empire in the 17th century, France in the late 18th and early 19th century, Germany twice in the early 20th century, and the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 20th century. At this point, most Americans will surely

protest: “But we’re different!” Americans—this writer included—think of themselves as a nation that has never sought to occupy others, and that through the years has been a progressive and liberating force. But historians tell us that all dominant powers thought they were special. Their very success confirmed for them that they were blessed. But as they became ever more powerful, the world saw them differently. The English satirist John Dryden described this phenomenon in a poem set during the Biblical King David’s reign. “When the chosen people grew too strong,” he wrote, “The rightful cause at length became the wrong.”

Has American power made its rightful cause turn into wrong? Will America simply have to learn to live in splendid isolation from the resentments of the world? This is certainly how some Americans see things. And it’s true that some of the opposition to the United States is thinly veiled envy. “Scratch an anti-

NO NEED FOR FEAR

The liberation of Normandy began a long U.S. effort to put the world back on its feet



American in Europe, and very often all he wants is a guest professorship at Harvard or to have an article published in *The New York Times*," says Denis MacShane, Britain's minister for Europe.

But there lies a deep historical fallacy in the view that "they hate us because we are strong." After all, U.S. supremacy is hardly a recent phenomenon. America has been the leading world power for almost a century now. By 1900 the United States was the richest country in the world. By 1919 it had decisively intervened to help win the largest war in history. By 1945 it had led the Allies to victory in World War II. For 10 years thereafter America accounted for 50 percent of world GDP, a much larger share than it holds today.

Yet for five decades after World War II, there was no general rush to gang up against the United States. Instead countries joined with Washington to confront the Soviet Union, a much poorer country (at

When George Marshall devised his historic plan, he insisted that the initiatives, ideas and control should lie with Europeans

best comprising 12 percent of world GDP, or a quarter the size of the American economy). What explains this? How—until now—did America buck the biggest trend in international history?

To answer this question, go back to 1945. When America had the world at its feet, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman chose not to create an American imperium, but to build a world of alliances and multilateral institutions. They formed the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system of economic cooperation and dozens of other international organizations. America helped get the rest of the world back on its feet by pumping out vast amounts

GREAT BRITAIN


Bush may have angered much of the world, and even his most stalwart ally faces a revolt within his own political party

BLAIR SWEATS IT OUT

BY STRYKER MCGUIRE

Tony Blair thought he was doing the world a favor. After the attacks of September 11, the British prime minister calculated that he could restrain President George W. Bush's instinctive unilateralism and turn him into "a born-again internationalist," as a Blair associate once put it. At first, it seemed to work. With Blair as his evangelist in chief, Bush assembled the broad coalition that went to war in Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda. Then came Iraq. With Blair urging him on, Bush dutifully sought the support of the U.N. Security Council. Now, amid the wreckage of that effort, Bush has been profoundly frustrated by his experiment in internationalism—but Blair is in much deeper trouble.

In the tearrooms of the House of Commons, where Blair has commanded an unassailable majority since 1997, there's even conspiratorial talk about the need for "regime change" in London. "Whatever happens, I think he will emerge diminished in authority," Chris Smith, a Labour member of Parliament who was in Blair's first cabinet, told *NEWSWEEK*. "I think the better course of action would



PETER MACDERMID—REUTERS

REGIME CHANGE?

His support for Bush on Iraq is threatening to cost the prime minister his job

be [for him] to step aside. If there's no U.N. authorization and he proceeds, three quarters of the population and a very substantial number of M.P.s in his party will be against him."

Things are bad enough already. Popular support for a war without U.N. authority has sunk to

19 percent. Blair's party erupted in full revolt last month, when nearly a third of Labour's M.P.s asserted that the case for going to war in Iraq was "as yet unproven." If Blair goes to war without U.N. backing, one or more of his cabinet ministers may resign. Yet another threat to Blair comes from the Labour Party's National Executive Committee, which is less firmly under his control. Last week some NEC members were calling for an extraordinary party conference to install a new leader. For now, this seems unlikely.

Washington has tried to ease Blair's plight, but with little effect. According to one U.S. diplomat in Europe, the "second resolution dance" of the past two weeks was "all about Blair." And when Bush announced last Friday that he was ready to promote the creation of a provisional Palestinian state, he was answering a request that Blair had been making for months. Yet some supposed "help" from America has been counterproductive. Last week Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld might have thought he was tossing a lifeline to Blair when he said it was possible the United States would go to war without British forces. But back in London, that seemed cruelly dismissive of Britain, which has sent 43,000 troops to the Gulf.

Blair is sticking to his guns. "We hold firm to the course we have set out," he told the Commons last week. That resolve has earned him respect even among some critics. He also has acquired, as London's antiwar *Guardian* newspaper said last week, "a more human side to the all-vanquishing Teflon Tony" of his earlier years, "a man set free from focus groups and ready to follow the logic of his convictions." For the time being, Labour loyalists and pro-war Conservatives will protect Blair from a parliamentary crisis. Yet he is now staking everything on the war itself. To survive, Blair needs a good one—in the words of a senior aide, "short, sharp and pain-lite."

With EMILY FLYNN in London

I've been all over the world in the last year, and almost every country I've visited has felt humiliated by this administration

of aid and private investment. The centerpiece of this effort, the Marshall Plan, amounted to \$120 billion in today's dollars.

Not least of these efforts was the special attention given to diplomacy. Consider what it must have meant for Franklin Roosevelt—at the pinnacle of power—to go halfway across the world to Tehran and Yalta to meet with Churchill and Stalin in 1943 and 1945. Roosevelt was a sick man, paralyzed from the waist down, hauling 10 pounds of steel braces on his legs. Traveling for 40 hours by sea and air took the life out of him. He did not have to go. He had plenty of deputies—Marshall, Eisenhower—who could have done the job. And he certainly could have summoned the others closer to him. But FDR understood that American power had to be coupled with a generosity of spirit. He insisted that British commanders like Montgomery be given their fair share of glory in the war. He brought China into the United Nations Security Council, even though it was a poor peasant society, because he believed that it was important to

the initiatives and control should lie with Europeans. For decades thereafter, the United States has provided aid, technical know-how and assistance across the world. It has built dams, funded magazines and sent scholars and students abroad so that people got to know America and Americans. It has paid great deference to its allies who were in no sense equals. It has conducted joint military exercises, even when they added little to U.S. readiness. For half a century, American presidents and secretaries of State have circled the globe and hosted their counterparts in a never-ending cycle of diplomacy.

Of course, all these exertions served our interests, too. They produced a pro-American world that was rich and secure. They laid the foundations for a booming global economy in which America thrives. But it was an enlightened self-interest that took into account the interests of others. Above all, it reassured countries—through word and deed, style and substance—that America's mammoth power need not be feared.

have the largest Asian country properly represented within a world body.


The standard set by Roosevelt and his generation endured. When George Marshall devised the Marshall Plan, he insisted that America should not dictate how its money be spent, but rather that

AMERICA'S GLOBAL REACH

With the world's biggest military and seemingly little concern for global opinion, the Bush administration worries critics who fear it may be trying to establish worldwide hegemony. An overview:



WAITING: U.S. troops in Kuwait



OPTING OUT

Bush has withdrawn from the protocol to combat global warming, rejected the creation of an international criminal court, scrapped the ABM treaty with Russia, abandoned talks on inspection rules for biological weapons and failed to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

BIG BUCKS

The United States spent \$322 billion on defense in 2001—more than the 11 next-highest defense-spending nations (shown on map). Soon U.S. spending will equal that of all other countries combined.

Brazil
\$10.5 billion

Colombia
\$382 million

Bolivia
\$123 million

Peru
\$196 million

HANDOUTS

In raw dollars (\$15 billion per year) the United States is the world's top donor of foreign aid. As a percentage of GNP, however, U.S. foreign aid ranks last among that of the richest nations.

KEY

Defense spending, 2001	U.S. foreign aid, 2002	Peacetime U.S. troops abroad
		<30
		30–5,000
		5,001–15,000
		>15,000 (Germany, South Korea, Japan)

Where Bush Went Wrong

GEORGE W. BUSH CAME INTO OFFICE with few developed ideas about foreign policy. He didn't seem much interested in the world. During the years that his father was envoy to China, ambassador to the United Nations, director of the CIA and vice president, Bush traveled two or three times outside the country. Candidate Bush's vision amounted

mostly to carving out positions different from his predecessor. Many conservatives thought the Clinton administration was overinvolved in the world, especially in nation-building, and hectoring in its diplomacy. So Bush argued that America should be "a humble nation," scale back its commitments abroad and not involve itself in rebuilding other countries.


Yet other conservatives, a number of whom became powerful within the administration, had a more sweeping agenda. Since the early '90s, they had argued that the global landscape was marked by two realities. One was American power. The post-cold-war world was overwhelmingly unipolar. The other was the spread of new international treaties and laws. The end of the cold war had given a boost to efforts to create a global consensus on topics like war crimes, land mines and biological weapons. Both observations were accurate. From them, however, these Bush officials drew the strange conclusion that America had little freedom to move in this new world. "The picture it painted in its early months was of a behemoth thrashing about against constraints that only it could see," notes the neoconservative writer Robert Kagan. For much of the world, it was mystifying to hear the most powerful country in the history of the world speak as though it were a besieged nation, boxed in on all sides.

In its first year the administration withdrew from five international treaties—and did so as brusquely as it could. It reneged on



—KAREN YOURISH

GRAPHIC BY KARL GUDE—NEWSWEEK



virtually every diplomatic effort that the Clinton administration had engaged in, from North Korea to the Middle East, often overturning public statements from Colin Powell supporting these efforts. It developed a language and diplomatic style that seemed calculated to offend the world. (President Bush has placed a portrait of Theodore Roosevelt in the White House. TR's most famous words of advice are worth recalling: "Speak softly and carry a big stick.") Key figures in the administration rarely traveled, foreign visitors were treated to perfunctory office visits, and state dinners were unheard of. On an annual basis, George W. Bush has visited fewer foreign countries than any president in 40 years. Still, he does better than Dick Cheney, who has been abroad only once since becoming vice president.

September 11 only added a new layer of assertiveness to Bush's foreign policy. Understandably shocked and searching for responses, the administration decided that it needed total freedom of action. When NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked the self-defense clause and offered America carte-blanche assistance, the administration essentially ignored it. It similarly marginalized NATO in the Afghan war. NATO has its limitations, which were powerfully revealed during the Kosovo campaign, but the signal this sent to our closest allies was that America didn't need them. Thus as seen by the rest of the world, 9-11 had a distressingly paradoxical effect. It produced a mobilization of American power and yet a narrowing of American interests. Suddenly, Washington was more powerful and determined to act. But

SHOCK AND AWE

After 9-11, the president needed to act forcefully in the world and assert U.S. power

it would act only for its own core security and even pre-emptively when it needed to. Bush later announced an expansive, vague Wilsonian vision—which has merit—but his style and methods overshadowed its potential promise.

The Bush administration could reasonably point out that it doesn't get enough credit for reaching out to the rest of the world. President Bush has, after all, worked with the United Nations on Iraq, increased foreign aid by 50 percent, announced a \$15 billion AIDS program and formally endorsed a Palestinian state. Yet none of these actions seems to earn him any good will. The reason for this is plain. In almost every case, the administration comes to multilateralism grudgingly, reluctantly, and with a transparent lack of sincerity. For a year now, President Bush has dismissed the notion that he should make any effort toward a Middle East peace process, even though it would have defused some of the anti-Americanism in the region as he sought to confront Iraq. Suddenly last week, to gain allies on Iraq and at the insistence of Tony Blair, Bush made a belated gesture toward the peace process. Is it surprising that people are not hailing this last-minute conversion?

Nowhere has this appearance of diplomatic hypocrisy been more striking than on Iraq. The president got high marks for his superb speech at the Security Council last September, urging the United Nations to get serious about enforcing its resolutions on Iraq and to try inspections one last time. Unfortunately, that appeal had been preceded by speeches by Cheney and comments by Rumsfeld calling inspections a sham—statements that actually contradicted American policy—and making clear that the administration had decided to go to war. The

only debate was whether to have the United Nations rubber-stamp this policy. To make matters worse, weeks after the new U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolution calling for fresh inspections, the administration began large-scale deployments on Iraq's bor-

Donald Rumsfeld often quotes Al Capone. But should our guiding philosophy really be the street talk of a Chicago mobster?

der. Diplomatically, it had promised a good-faith effort to watch how the inspections were going; militarily, it was gearing up for war with troops that could not stay ready in the desert forever. Is it any wonder that other countries, even those that would be willing to endorse a war with Iraq, have felt that the diplomacy was a charade, pursued simply to allow time for military preparations?

President Bush's favorite verb is "expect." He announces peremptorily that he "expects" the Palestinians to dump Yasir Arafat, "expects" countries to be with him or against him, "expects" Turkey to cooperate. It is all part of the administration's basic approach toward foreign policy, which is best described by the phrase used for its war plan—"shock and awe." The notion is that the United States needs to intimidate countries with its power and assertiveness, always threatening, always denouncing, never showing weakness. Donald Rumsfeld often quotes a line from Al Capone: "You will get more with a kind word and a gun than with a kind word alone."

But should the guiding philosophy of the world's leading democracy really be the tough talk of a Chicago mobster? In terms of effectiveness, this strategy has been a disaster. It has alienated friends and delighted enemies. Having traveled around the world and met with senior government officials in dozens of countries over the past year, I can report that with the exception of Britain and Israel, every country the administration has dealt with feels humiliated by it. "Most officials in Latin American countries today are not anti-American types," says Jorge Castañeda, the reformist foreign minister of Mexico, who resigned two months ago. "We have studied in the United States or worked there. We like and understand America. But we find it extremely irritating to be


Clinton used force in Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo. But while assertive in many ways, his administration did not scare the world.

treated with utter contempt." Last fall, a senior ambassador to the United Nations, in a speech supporting America's position on Iraq, added an innocuous phrase that could have been seen as deviating from that support. The Bush administration called up his foreign minister and demanded that he be formally reprimanded within an hour. The ambassador now seethes when he talks about U.S. arrogance. Does this really help America's cause in the world? There are dozens of stories like this from every part of the world.

In diplomacy, style is often substance. Consider this fact: the Clinton administration used force on three important occasions—Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo. In none of them did it take the matter to the United Nations Security Council, and there was little discussion that it needed to do so. Indeed, Kofi Annan later made statements that seemed to justify the action in Kosovo, explaining that state sovereignty should not be used as a cover for humanitarian abuses. Today Annan has (wrongly) announced that American action in Iraq outside the United Nations will be "illegal." While the Clinton administration—or the first Bush administration—was assertive in many ways, people did not seek assurances about its intentions. The Bush administration does not bear all the blame for this dramatic change in attitudes. Because of 9-11, it has had to act forcefully on the world stage and assert American power. But that should have been all the more reason to adopt a posture of consultation and cooperation while doing what needed to be done. The point is to scare our enemies, not terrify the rest of the world.

QUESTION OF STYLE

Many conservatives thought the Clinton administration was overinvolved in the world



CHRIS USHER/APX

PART FOUR


The Way to Buck History

IN 1992, PAUL WOLFOWITZ, THEN A SENIOR official in the first Bush administration, authored a Pentagon document that argued that in an era of overwhelming American dominance, U.S. foreign policy should be geared toward maintaining our advantage and discouraging the rise of other great powers. The premise behind this strategy is perfectly sensible. The United States should attempt to lengthen its era of supremacy for as long as it can. Any country would try to do the same (though a wise one would not be foolish enough to announce it). For that reason, the elder Bush ordered the Pentagon to water down the document so that it was not quite so arrogant.

In principle, American power is not simply good for America; it is good for the world. Most of the problems the world faces today—from terrorism to AIDS to nuclear proliferation—will be solved not with *less* U.S. engagement but with *more*. The lesson of the 1990s—of Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Rwanda—is surely that American action, with all its flaws, is better than inaction. Other countries are simply not ready or able, at this point, to take on the challenges and burdens of leadership. Around the world, people understand this. In a global survey taken last year, the most intriguing—and unreported—finding was that large majorities of people in most countries thought that the world would be a more dangerous place if there were a rival to the American superpower. Sixty-four percent of the French, 70 percent of Mexicans, 63 percent of Jordanians felt this way. (Ironically, old Europe was more pro-American on this issue than new Europe. Only 27 percent of Bulgarians agreed.)

The Bush administration wants democracy in the Middle East? Well, it got it in Turkey.

The real question is how America should wield its power. For the past half century it has done so through alliances and global institutions and in a consensual manner. Now it faces new challenges—and not simply because of what the Bush administration has done. The old order is changing. The alliances forged during the cold war are weakening. Institutions built to reflect the realities of 1945—such as the U.N. Security Council—risk becoming anachronistic. But if the administration wishes to further weak-



WASHINGTON

The diplomatic fight is almost finished. But the blame game has just begun.


POWELL IN THE BUNKER

BY RICHARD WOLFFE AND TAMARA LIPPER

Beyond his ornate waiting rooms, and behind his vast outer office, there's a small, intimate study where Colin Powell retreats from the public posturing of international politics. It's rare for any foreign official to enter the secretary of State's inner sanctum. Yet last week Powell ushered the obscure foreign minister of Guinea in for some quality time alone amid Henry Kissinger's memoirs and the Dean Acheson biographies. Just four months ago, Powell was celebrating one of his biggest victories

with an extraordinary 15-0 vote against Iraq at the United Nations. Now he was being forced to entertain one of the leaders of a tiny West African nation—the former French colony that happens to hold this month's presidency of the Security Council—to stave off one of the most frustrating and public defeats of Powell's diplomatic career. Despite his precious face time with Powell, the Guinean minister emerged sounding like a dove. "We are trying to solve the problem peacefully," François Fall told the cameras outside.

Sitting in his private study between calls to his counterparts



PHOTOGRAPH BY CHARLES DUMANNY—CONTACT FOR NEWSWEEK

FACING OFF

Powell reached across the Potomac to tinker with Rumsfeld's war plans

across the globe, Powell sounds like a man ready to fight for his reputation, even as the president edges closer to launching military strikes. Dressed in a blue windbreaker, Powell makes no apologies for leading the administration into six months of U.N. wrangling and what his critics have called the inspections trap. "Now lots of people call me 'the reluctant warrior' or 'the dove.' And I say fine," he tells NEWSWEEK as he opens his jacket to thrust out his chest. "Would you like to tattoo it on me? I don't mind. I've seen war, I've been in war, I've led men in battle... I don't have to demonstrate my toughness or my credentials to anyone."

As the chief diplomat in one of the least diplomatic administrations in living memory, Powell has taken a very different journey to war than his fellow principal players advising President Bush. Powell's hawkish, neoconservative critics have long contended that he is somehow soft on Saddam—not least because he initially questioned the need to fight to liberate Kuwait a decade ago.

Yet few of his critics understand what it means to sit on the brink of battle as well as the former four-star general who served two tours of duty in Vietnam. Often, Powell and his adversaries seem to be speaking the same language—but for divergent purposes. Both sides agreed that going to the United Nations could be helpful. The hawks saw the new policy as providing political cover for war, humoring the international community while remaining hostile to the return of the weapons inspectors. Powell saw the U.N. process, backed by a substantial military buildup, as a strategy to actually avert war—as long as Saddam got the message.

"I think there was a realistic chance that it could have worked, if [Saddam] realized the seriousness of the president's intent," Powell says. "Others would say, no, there never was." Leading those "others" who dismissed the chances of a peaceful disarmament is Vice President Dick Cheney, who warned in August that the U.N. route would provide

"false comfort." President Bush seems to have fallen somewhere in between. "Were we optimistic? No," says one senior Bush aide. "Did we enter with pessimism that Saddam was going to comply? Of course. His behavior requires it."

As the months dragged on, Powell's course became harder to sustain in the face of constant hawkish pressure. Eventually, his friends say, he faced a choice: get with the program, or move on. Richard Haass, director of policy planning at State, suggests that Powell was merely following orders. "The president made a decision in the summer of 2002," Haass says. "We all saluted at that point. That is the way it works." Powell became the pitchman for war before the United Nations. But he never spoke with the urgency or passion of the hawks. "It was something that had to be dealt with sooner or later," Powell says simply.

Even as he saluted his commander in chief, Powell did not lay down his arms in the internal battle over Iraq. NEWSWEEK has learned that as the Pentagon drew up its military strategy, Powell emerged from his diplomatic foxhole at the State Department to question sharply the first war plans presented by Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. forces in the Gulf, and Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In particular, Powell challenged the early plans favored by Rumsfeld for a relatively small-scale force to surgically destroy strongholds of Saddam's regime. "I was a former chairman [of the Joint Chiefs] and I was in the gulf war," Powell says. "So I think I have made useful con-

Vietnam vet. "And I notice over time the plan has changed a bit."

Of course, Rumsfeld has also strayed into Powell's diplomatic territory, questioning the British contribution to war and bluntly dismissing France and Germany as "old Europe." When asked if his job had been complicated by Rumsfeld's blunt commentary, Powell broke into a broad grin. "Don and I speak candidly every day," he joked, using the diplomatic code for a dustup.

Were the administration's internal battles partly responsible for the chaos at the United Nations? Did the hawkish tone and tactics leave Powell destined to fail? The French say yes: the United States was never serious about inspections. But Powell and his adversaries are at least united in turning their fire on the French for reneging on the last resolution.

Some critics point the finger at Powell himself, and his reluctance to travel to foreign capitals. But that may be naive, according to Powell's allies. In the eternal ideological disputes over foreign policy, Powell simply cannot afford to leave town. "The fact of the matter is that decisions are made here," says Armitage. "He's got to be here to make his views known to the president." In what seemed like the final days of diplomacy, only Bush was able to leave Washington—to jet to the Azores for a crisis summit with his British and Spanish allies.

At State, Powell's fans fear the current crisis may lead him to consider leaving office. But his closest friends insist the old general is no quitter and instead point to a series of other successes—

'The president made a decision' about war, Powell's aide says. 'We all saluted.'

tributions, appropriate to my experience but also appropriate to my current position." Some civilian officials at the Pentagon were irked at Powell's initial interest in the war plan, but appeared to accept his interventions. "There wasn't a bad reaction," says Powell's deputy, Richard Armitage, who is also a

including last week's promise to release the long-delayed road map toward peace in the Middle East. "I think the secretary feels pretty good that he gave the Security Council a chance to be entirely relevant," says Armitage. "I think he figures he's done his job."

WITH JOHN BARRY

en and indeed destroy these institutions and traditions—by dismissing or neglecting them—it must ask itself: What will take their place? By what means will America maintain its hegemony?

For some in the administration, the answer is obvious: America will act as it chooses, using what allies it can find in any given situation. As a statement of fact this is sometimes the only approach Washington will be able to employ. But it is not a durable long-term strategy. It would require America to build new alliances and arrangements every time it faced a crisis. More important, operating in a conspicuously unconstrained way, in service of a strategy to maintain primacy, will paradoxically produce the very competition it hopes to avoid. The last two years are surely instructive. The Bush administration's swagger has generated international opposition and active measures to thwart its will. Though countries like France and Russia

cannot become great-power competitors simply because they want to—they need economic and military strength—they can use what influence they have to disrupt American policy, as they are doing over Iraq. In fact, the less responsibility we give them, the more freedom smaller powers have to make American goals difficult to achieve.

In many cases the United States simply can't "go it alone." The current crises over North Korea, Iran's nuclear program and the leakage of fissile materials from Russia are all good examples. And while the United States can act largely by itself in certain special circumstances, such as Iraq, the fewer allies, bases and air rights it has, the higher the costs will be in American lives and treasure. And those costs will become unbearable if the United States has to both wage war and pay for postwar reconstruction on its own.

WORLD ECONOMY


A costly war could drive more foreign investors away from the United States, hurting living standards and our influence abroad

THE UNMIGHTY DOLLAR

BY CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ JR.

As America prepares for war, all eyes are fixed on the capabilities of its troops and high-tech weapons. Less noticed is an Achilles' heel that is likely to be made a lot more tender by the war, with important negative implications for future U.S. living standards—and influence.

While the United States is the greatest power the world has ever seen, it is also the greatest debtor, living beyond its means and heavily dependent on foreign lenders. For years America has been importing more than it exports. These "current account" deficits have now reached an annual rate of \$500 billion, or about 5 percent of GDP and 50 percent more than the United States spends on defense. America has been paying for the difference by borrowing. In this case, the money has to come from foreign lenders because the buying that generates the deficits is done abroad. The debt America owes abroad has now reached about \$2 trillion, or about 20 percent of GDP. At its current growth rate, total U.S. foreign debt could easily top 65 percent of GDP by 2010. Even with interest rates of only 3 percent, it would take nearly \$200 billion an-



MONEY FLOWS
The dollar has long been the currency of choice. Now the euro is gaining popularity.

nually for the United States simply to finance the debt.

The deficit ultimately arises because America saves far less than other countries, and the war is about to make that situation a lot worse. Economist Martin Wolf has conservatively estimated the cost of the war and of rebuilding Iraq over a 10-year period at \$156 billion to \$755 billion. Other estimates have run as high as \$3 trillion. In the 1991 gulf war,

most of the cost was paid by other countries. This time, the United States will have to bear most of the burden itself. Without new taxes, this will greatly increase the U.S. budget deficit.

For a long time it has been relatively easy to get the foreign funds as overseas investors have rushed to buy U.S. stocks, bonds, real estate and companies. During the tech bubble of the 1990s America became the location of choice for investors from countries with large international reserves, such as China, Taiwan, Japan and Western Europe. The flood of money buoyed the dollar and stocks, allowing Americans to

live beyond their means by consuming more than they produced.

More recently, however, there has been a significant change in the flow of the foreign funds that is as critical to U.S. economic health as the flow of oil. Over the past year, private foreign investment in the United States has fallen dramatically. It has been partially offset by increased buying of U.S. Treasury notes by Asian governments. But, at the same time, some governments like Russia have also begun to shift some of their reserve currency holdings from dollars to euros. As a result, we have seen the dollar fall in value against the euro by about 25 percent. That kind of a decline occurs when foreigners decide to put their money someplace other than the United States. U.S. international debt is getting so large, foreigners become nervous about their holdings and cut back on buying.

Thus, the biggest casualty of the upcoming war with Iraq may be the U.S. economy. A dramatic increase in debt could result in a fall of the dollar that would reduce U.S. living standards while significantly increasing the cost of projecting U.S. power abroad. The only way to avoid this scenario is by raising taxes, something that will also reduce living standards. Another option is to become more dependent on lenders like China and Saudi Arabia. Either way, U.S. power may not loom nearly so large as many now imagine.

PRESTOWITZ is president of the Economic Strategy Institute and author of the forthcoming book "Rogue Nation."

The war on terror has given the United States a core security interest in the stability of societies. Failed states can become terrorist havens. That means we must focus attention and expenditures on nation-building. For all its flaws, the United Nations is doing on-the-ground work to create stable societies in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Cambodia and Mozambique—and for the most part, it's succeeding. The European Union and Japan pay most of these bills. Were Washington to move to an entirely ad hoc approach, why would the rest of the world agree to clean up its messes?


Fighting terror also requires constant cooperation with countries across the globe. America could not have captured Qaeda strategist Khalid Shaikh Mohammed without the active partnership of Pakistan. And yet if you ask Pakistanis what they have gotten for this, they will point out that American tariffs continue to strangle their textile industry and U.S. aid remains meager. Having asked for help in de-Islamizing their education system—a matter of crucial concern to America—they have received little. Meanwhile the overall tone of Bush administration foreign policy has made General Musharraf embarrassed to be pro-American.

The last point is perhaps the most crucial one. Being pro-American should not be a political liability for our allies. The diplomatic fiasco over Turkey is an excellent example. For well over a year now it has been obvious to anyone watching that the Turkish people were deeply opposed to a war in Iraq. Yet the administration assumed that it could bully or bribe Turkey into giving it basing rights. But Turkey over the last year has become more democratic. The military is less willing to overrule politicians. The new ruling party, AK, is more open to internal debate than Turkey's other parties. It allowed its members to vote freely on the motion to allow America basing rights, only to have it defeated. Since more than 90 percent of the Turks oppose giving America basing rights, this should not have been surprising. The administration wants democracy in the Middle East. Well, it got it.

As usual, diplomatic style played a role. "The way the U.S. has been conducting the negotiations has been, in general, humiliating," says a retired senior diplomat, Ozdem Sanberk.

The costs of this mishap are real. If Turkey allowed America to open a second front, we could end the war more quickly and with fewer casualties, and the thorny issues relating to Turkish-Kurdish relations could be more easily handled. But the larger lesson is surely that in an increasingly democratic world American power must be seen as legitimate not only by other governments but by their people. Does America really want a world in which it gets its way in the face of constant public anger only by twisting arms, offering bribes and allying with dictators?

There are many specific ways for the United



LUC CRANIG—REUTERS

SPECIAL ROLE

Marching in Côte d'Ivoire against French interference in the country's civil war

States to rebuild its relations with the world. It can match its military buildup with diplomatic efforts that demonstrate its interest and engagement in the world's problems. It can stop over-subsidizing American steelworkers, farmers and textile-mill owners, and open its borders to goods from poorer countries. But above all, it must make the world comfortable with its power by leading through consensus. America's special role in the world—its ability to buck history—is based not simply on its great strength, but on a global faith that this power is legitimate. If America squanders that, the loss will outweigh any gains in domestic security. And this next American century could prove to be lonely, brutish and short.

With bureau reports

Does America really want a world in which we get our way by twisting arms, paying bribes and allying with dictators?



'It Will Be a War for The Iraqi People'

WITHIN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, NO ONE HAS pushed longer and harder for the looming confrontation with Iraq than Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Last week Wolfowitz explained his views to NEWSWEEK's Daniel Klaidman and Jeffrey Bartholet. Excerpts:

NEWSWEEK: If the Iraq threat is so real, why has it been so difficult to get the international community onboard?

WOLFOWITZ: For one thing, there's a lot of what economists call "free rider" activity going on. People are so used to the United States taking care of problems, so they can reap the benefits in whatever form serves their purposes. Sometimes it's as simple as they don't want to buck a domestic tide. Blair is a real stand-up guy, and it takes a lot of political courage to do that. But, unfortunately, part of his problem is caused by the number of leaders who are actually demagoguing this issue and whipping up opinion.

But even in countries that are strong allies of ours there's a majority that's against us.

Yeah, but they're hearing all these echoes from France and Germany and supposedly respectable European opinion. I think another part of it is that they're not threatened directly the way we are. They didn't experience September 11th. We have, historically, also had to lead the world on the

issue of nonproliferation. Finally, I don't think many people really appreciate what a horrible regime this is. If it comes to the use of force against Saddam Hussein, it will be a war for the Iraqi people, not against the Iraqi people. It will be a war to end Saddam's war against the Iraqi people.

The U.N. has estimated that the cost of rebuilding Iraq will be \$30 billion over the first three years. Are you worried that you won't have enough allies to help, not only with the war effort but to the postwar rebuilding?

It is very encouraging how many countries have stepped forward and given us help of various kinds, from basing [and] overflight rights to actually contributing forces. This is not going to be a unilateral action, if it's required. But a lot who live in the neighborhood do not want to be identified as Saddam's opponents until they're sure that he's gone.

What keeps you up at night as you're poised for this enterprise?

LOOKING FOR FRIENDS

Wolfowitz says many who oppose war are not threatened, as the United States is

The thing that worries me the most is these chemical and biological weapons, because we're quite sure he has them, and we know he's used them, and we don't think he'd have qualms about doing so [again]. There are a lot of other things that one can worry about. There's tension up in northern Iraq. [And] it's going to be a challenge to try to move as quickly as we can to hand over responsibility to Iraqis.

How do you make that transition to Iraqis governing themselves?

My instinct says it comes through the process of elections. I suspect that some people will emerge as natural leaders, and other people will emerge as natural troublemakers and will hopefully get marginalized.

Do you have specific people in mind?

No, absolutely not. This is not something for Americans [to decide]. I suppose I could tell you one thing. I would like someone who says: "I'm not a Sunni, I'm not a Shia, I'm not a Christian, I'm not a Turk, I'm not an Arab, I'm not Kurd. I'm an Iraqi."

How do you think a regime change in Iraq could lead to democratic reform in the Arab world?

The notion of a sort of domino effect that would spread from one country to its neighbor in a kind of mechanical way is silly. But freedom and democracy are enormously powerful ideas. If you look at what's happened in East Asia over the last twenty years, you see that usually these things happen in an evolutionary, gradual way.

What is your response to critics who question the administration's commitment to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement?

The president was very, very clear when he spoke last summer about Israel and the Palestinian state living side by side in peace. Clearly the appointment of a moderate Palestinian as prime minister has given us a new opportunity to discuss the peace. But I also think it's important to tell the world—especially the Arab world—that we're not dealing with Saddam Hussein in order to ignore the Arab-Israeli problem. We're concerned about both. Saddam Hussein has been one of the leading opponents of peace between Arabs and Israelis for more than two decades. ■

PHOTOGRAPH BY DAVID RUME KENNEDY—FOR NEWSWEEK

Mexico and Chile are now key swing votes in the U.N. Their actions could change the shape of Latin American diplomacy.

A RARE OPPORTUNITY

BY JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA

In Chile and Mexico a vigorous debate is taking place. Many in Santiago and Mexico City are questioning whether these two countries should have joined the U.N. Security Council, only to find themselves between a rock and a hard place: support the United States on Iraq and betray their principles, or oppose the United States and pay the consequences. Behind this debate lies a broader, more complex dilemma: whether Latin America should actively participate in the construction of the new post-cold-war world order, characterized both by U.S. hegemony and by the rest of the world's effort to limit and control it, knowing that this participation involves the acceptance of new responsibilities, the modification of basic principles and the ceding of important segments of sovereignty. Or whether the subcontinent should remain faithful to its traditions and convictions, knowing that this implies its "absence at the creation" of an order it will have to submit to in the end.

Most arguments used in Mexico and Chile against participation in the highest body of multilateral legitimacy are contradictory. A country cannot support multilateralism, the United Nations and international law on the one hand, and refuse to participate in the Council on the other; a nation cannot denounce U.S. unilateralism and then refuse to belong to the only mechanism that can, very rarely, place limits on that unilateralism. The arguments used against Chile's or Mexico's belonging to the Council ("We're very vulnerable because of the border or the imminent approval of a free-trade agreement"; "We're more committed than others to the principles of the U.N.



MIKE SEGAR-REUTERS

HUNG JURY

The U.N. Security Council has been deadlocked over Iraq

Charter, in view of our nationalist and/or foreign-policy traditions") can be applied to almost every country in the region.

Three countries—and, until recently, four (El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador and Argentina)—still use American currency; there is a strong and growing U.S. military presence in Colombia; Venezuela sells a considerable proportion of its oil to the United States; Costa Rica largely lives off U.S. retirees. And there is no shortage of countries in the region imbued with a strong nationalist tradition in foreign policy: from Perón's Argentina to Vargas's Brazil and, of course, Mexico, Chile and Cuba. If every Latin American country that is to some degree vulnerable to the United States and/or maintains a traditional foreign policy abstained from joining the Security Council, it would be left without Latin American membership.

Beyond this unpersuasive reasoning, a contradiction of even greater dimensions stands out. Latin America is one of the regions of the world whose interests would best be served by the existence of a new international order that is at once rigorous, broad and precise. When it comes to environmental law, indigenous people's or migrants' rights, human rights or international trade, the defense of democracy or workers' rights, Latin American nations have more to gain and less to lose than almost any other region in the world from the creation of a regime of universal values.

But, at the same time, few parts of the world today demonstrate such commitment to a series of traditions and principles contrary to this universalist project. Non-intervention, the unrestricted defense of sovereignty, the reluctance to accept any explicit ceding of sovereignty, an emphatic rhetorical and ideological nationalism, are all constants in the stances and sentiments of most Latin American governments. Partly for historic reasons, occasionally due to internal

political considerations, in other cases for geographic motives, the majority maintain a great deal of skepticism about the type of new order that can be constructed.

Identifying the opportunities offered by today's situation and taking advantage of them is now up to two Latin American governments in particular. Not because either, Mexico or Chile, has the capacity to alone determine the direction of the new international system. Nor because both coincidentally hold a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council during 2003. But because these two nations—due to their economic and political clout, their geographic location, their diplomatic vocation and tradition and their vision of the world—are perhaps the only ones capable of championing forward-looking stances in the region. Nonetheless, they still face an uphill battle against the ideological resistance and baggage, which constantly undermine their ability to provide diplomatic leadership in Latin America. Part of the problem is that their national identities were forged by 19th and 20th centuries' nationalism, which forms the backbone of their creation as nation-states. And this nationalism, instead of basing itself on the search to preserve and pursue national interests in an international context necessarily in flux, is anchored to Westphalian concepts of sovereignty that are by definition timeless.

Latin American elites have demonstrated a stubborn reluctance to engage in their countries' separation from the past. Mexico and Chile, the countries and governments that, fortunately, represent Latin America in the Security Council, are without a doubt the most capable of breaking this inertia and assuming leadership: it's not an easy task, but it has become increasingly indispensable and unavoidable.

CASTAÑEDA stepped down as Mexican foreign minister in January 2003; he teaches International Relations at the National Autonomous Mexican University and at New York University.